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EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM TO GO INTO FORCE:
FRANCE LIFTS RESERVE ON SYSTEM
Valery Giscard drEstaing, President of the French Republic, announced
today that his government has lifted its reserve on the European
Monetary System. The system is expected to enter into force on
March 12.
ln Frankfurt, Germany Iast February 14, Mr. Francois-Xavier
0rtol i, Vice-President of the European Commission in charge of
economic and monetary pol icy, outl ined the reasons for setting up
the system and explained how it would work.
The main points of his speech were as follows:
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EMS MUST BE A LYNCHPIN OF GREATER ECONOI'fIC COORDINATION
"The future management of the system...will be demanding. The Iogicbehind it is not purely monetary and it is not merely an intervention
agreement between central banks; to be successful it must be the pivot
of joint measures to bring our economies more closely into line with
regard to their objectives, behavior and achievements.rl
Earlier attempts to develop a monetary policy for the Community
ttwere prompted by two major considerations", he said, "The first
consideration is a political one and reflects the conviction that our
countries have a common destiny. The idea of European Union, with
all its imprecision, is the expression of this aspiration, and Economic
and Monetary Union the key instrument.
"The second consideration is much more practical and of much more
immediate significance. !t stems from two premises: that monetary
instability constitutes a major threat to our economies, and that to
put an end to such instability, we must begin by establishing in
Europe, between highly interdependent and institutional ly I inked economies,
a zone of monetary stabi I i ty. "
ETIROPE YEARNS FOR GREATER STABILITY
rrA more detailed analysis of this argument reveals that it has a whole
series of components:
Fi rstly, there is considerable disappointment wi th the negative
impact of the system of floating exchange rates on international competition,
market and profi t expectations, the growth in investment and, lastly,
growth and employment. The absence of monetary rules has very serious
practical impl ications and also a psychological impact since it affects
the ability of companies and of economic agents generally to plan ahead,and
since it undermines confiden:e.
Secondly, there is fear about the
which is faced with a monetary and
its achievements to date and, more
freedom in international trade may
future of the European Common Market,
economic crisis that might jeopardize
general ly, a fear that the principle of
not be upheld.
fhirdly, at a time when our interdependence is self-evident (we transact
between ourselves half of our aggregate foreign trade), there is an
awareness of the I imits to economic pol icy coordination that is based
on good wi ll alone; hence the need to secure a sound and sufficiently
stringent basis for the restoration of economic order and a revival of
growth by relying on the key role played by the monetary constraint, which
acts both directly and as a catalyst for other policies. The construction
of Europe, which has been made too exclusively dependent on the good will
shown by Member States, needs fi rmer anchoring points.
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Lastly, there is the force of our common interests in determining
the new pattern of international economic and monetary relationships,
ln short, the world is thi rsting for
more than any other area, and it must make
stabi I ity by accepting the constraints and
with it."
stability; Europe needs it
a start on creating such
common discipl ines that go
THE OBJECTIVES AND }CCHANISMS OF EMS
rrThe f irst objective is to ma,intain. real 
,stabil_ity in the
relationships between the currencies participat,ing in the
system.
(") ln order to do this, any two Community currencies will
each have'a maximum permissible fluctuation margin of 2,25'4
against one another, with the exceptlon of the Iira, for which
the margin will be 6%. Once the limit is reached, intervention
will be automatic, but here we see the first difference with
the'snaker. This Iies in the scale and time-span of the resources
deployed to help ensure that the maximum divergence limit is not
exceeded and also in their form since the European Monetary
Cooperation Fund (fmCf) witt henceforth issue European Currency
Units (fCU) against the deposit by the central banks of 20% of
thei r gold and dol Iar reserves.
ln order to deal with any speculation, the unlimited very
short-term credit which central banks make available to one
another is extended from 30 to 45 days and will be renewable for
three rnonths within certain I imits. Short-term credit may be
granted for nine months instead of six months as in the present
monetary arrangement and the amount of 14,000 bi I I ion ECU
actual ly avai Iable is more than double the previous figure. Both
in real terms and as a means of dissuasion, this will considerably
strengthen the I ines of defense for maintaining the quasi-stableparities which wi I I be establ ished.
rrConmunity medium-term credit machinery will be strengthened and
will have a ceiling of 11,000 billion ECU as against 5,450 million
ECU today. This is an improvement along the same Iines, though
i ts purpose wi I I obviously be di fferent. Short-term credi t is
essential ly a means of containing erratic movements on the market.
It ceases to apply as soon as the s.ituation returns to normal.
Medium-term credit can either take over from short-term support -
thus avoiding any immediate drain on the currency reserves of a
debtor country - or, as will more frequently be the case, it can
fulfill quite a different role, that is to say it can enable a
Member State which pursues an economic policy in line with the
comron interest but which is in temporary balance of payments
difficulties, to avoid the unnecessary constraints involved in the
need to restore its external accounts too rapidly.
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(U) A second line of defense in maintaining parities is the
establishment of a preventive system based on the use of a
divergence indicator, defined in relation to the ECU, i.e. the
currency-basket unit of account.
When a currency diverges, that is to say when it moves away
from the ECU by more than a certain percentage, there will be a
presumption that the relevant country will take action. Notice
that I use the word action, which is a broad term, and not the
word intervention. This arrangement was included in the system
so as to deal with the problem of the involuntary debtor or
creditor, i.e. to impose on a country whose currency was regarded
as pulling the other currgncies upwards or downwards a more
specific responsibil ity in easing tensions.tt
NEW NOTIONS IMRODUCED BY H"IS
rrHovlever, I feel that the new mechanism wi I I help to change, in
a very desirable way, the nature of the European Monetary System
by means which have little to do with the problem of the involuntary
debtor.
First of all, as I have said, it introduces the very desirable
notion of pre.vention into the system -- a new notion and one which
may make eur machinery more flexible and more effective at less
overal I cost. This preventive action wi I I be accompanied, where
necessary, by diversification of the intervention currencies,
Corrmunity currencies or non-member currencies, thereby ensuring
that the measufes taken are better adapted to the market situation.
Secondly, the divergence indicator concept gives the system a
further characteri st i c: i ts use makes i t necessary to i nvesti gate
the causes of the strains which appear on the foreign exchange
market at a given time. lt induces the authorities to act in the
light of these causes and not simply - and automatically - by
purchasing or sel I ing foreign exchange with a view to maintaining
the spread between two currencies within certain I imits.rl
DIFFERENT CURRENCY STMINS REQUIRE DIFFEREM SOLUTIONS
ItThese strains may stem from very different sources, necessitating very
different corrective act!on, They may stem from the system itself:
From the short-term weakness of a currency'or from a reaction to a
policy - perhaps a monetary policy - which the market judges to be
incompatible with the maintenance of the parity chosen, or may even be
a judgment on what is now seen to be an unsuitable parity. They may have
an external origin: the weakening or, alternatiVely, the strengthening of
a major non-member currency (such as the dollar) acting on the whole of
the European ITrcnetary system through the pressure of available liquidity."
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ON ONE OF OUR CURRENCIES
rrConsequently, the remedies wil I themselves change: i t wi ll
not simply be a question of intervention - however diversified -
on the exchange market. lt may be necessary to take measures of
domestic monetary pol icy or to rethink overal I economic pol icy or
to change the central rate.
This diversification of action, combined with more effective
coordination of pol icies and wi th a greater measure of sol idarity,
and this systematic organization of an effective dialogue, are the
best way in which to allay the fears associated with the rigidity of
the system and also the fear that it may have an inflationary or
deflationary impact.
As you will have noted, I have attempted to show what guarantees
of orderly functioning the monetary system i tsel f offers.
These guarantees are, first of all, technical ones, namely
mobi I ization of sufficient funds to combat speculation, provision
for preventive measures, establishment of machinery to remedy the
causes of strains. Finally the arrangement goes further than a mere
agreement on exchange rates concluded between central banks in providing
for the use of domestic monetary and economic pol icy instruments,
including, where necessary, those within the sphere of competence of the
governments themselves.
A further guarantee is afforded by the flexibility of the system,
which readily permits changes in central rates as a safety valve and
not a mere convenience."
EMS BOT]ND TO FACE PROBLHVIS
"This analysis, however, cal ls for three concluding remarks:
- fi rstly, this system, which is more comprehensive, more complex
and more refined, combining automatic mechanisms and potential
means of act ion, must be r'got of f the ground". lt has st i I I to
undergo its baptism of fire and difficulties - some of them
unexpected - are bound to arise. I trust only - and believe -
that we have not failed to see where the real issues will lie.
- secondly, the system will, as I mentioned earlier, have to
operate within a disturbed international monetary envi ronment and,
in managing it, we wi Il have to take into account the prospective
developments in this field;
- final ly, exchange rate stabi I ity must correspond to economic real ity.rl
L_l
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BASIC CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS OF EMS
ll.'rro ensure that the basic conditions for the success of the
Eurgpe?n Monetary System are in jact met: the technical
condi tion that it wi l I reflect suTTiciently homogeneous economic
pol icies and performance, and the pol itica] condi tion that it
wi I t help to solve the main problems confronting Europe's economy.
(") ln this field, the fi rst priority is to coordinate
economic pol icies. There is a danger under the system that the
relationship between European currencies wi I I not be stable enough.
Despite the flexibility which I have just referred to, the EMS
will be meaningful only if parity changes are reasonably rare and
reflect only objective trends. lf this is not the case, there will
be no area of monetary stability in Europe, but simply a system ofperiodical ly recording variations. ln the long run, stable
exchange rate relationships can be safeguarded only through the
convergence of economic performances, that is to say by bringing
down inflation rates and by achieving satisfactory balance of payments
pos i t i ons .
However, although convergence is expressed in terms of figures
and performance, it depends on the joint definition and monitoring
of objectives and pol icies, that is to say on coordination. How
would it be possible for countries to take part in the same exchange
rate system while at the same time continuing to pursue different
monetary, budgetary and other pol icies? The EMS must therefore be
complemented by a convergence of economic policy extending to
the main fields of macroeconomic policy and to the main instrumental
pol icies.
Th i s means that coord i nat ion
than at present and wi I I have
decisions I ikely to influence
actually taken. lt means that
pol icies, whi le continuing to
or central banks, will become
have to be treated as such."
wi I I have to be much more systematic
to take place before major national
exchange rate relationships are
the definition of domestic monetary
be the respons i bi I i ty of governments
a matter of common concern and wi I I
ASSETS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE NEW PROGMM
,we have three assets at our disposal for implementing this program -
the awareness, which was expressed during the preparatory h,ork, of thelogical connection between the monetary system and economic pol icies;
recent experience of concerted economic action, which has Ied us to
strengthen our procedures and to breathe new life into the various
bodies which work out the beginnings of a community economic policy;
and finally, in the light of these facts, and relying on this improved
caPacity for managing our affairs, the natural concern to make the major
pol itical initiative a Iasting success. I do not overestimate thesefactors. However, bearing in mind the events of 1978 as I saw them,I be I ieve they a re ve ry s t rong ."
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FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF EMS
"l now come to the possible ways in which the system might develop.
They are difficult to foresee because they will, in large measure,
depend on the way in which the system operates. ln the normal course
of events, developments might take three main di rections:
1. The present arrangements for depositing reserves could be
transformed into a Community reserve system managed by the EMCF;
2. ECU could be created against the deposit of national
currencies and no longer against the deposit of gold and foreign
exchange reserves alone, wi th impl ications for the condi tional i ty
of such creat i on;
3. The ECU could gradually take on the role of an instrument for
settl ing private transactions and of a reserve currency, and
thus no longer serve only as a means of settlement between
cent ral banks .
Where credits are concerned, drawing rights on a fund would replace
ceilings for swap credits. lt is also possible that the ECU will no
longer be merely an instrument for carrying out calculations but a reserve
instrument, ranking wi th gold, foreign exchange and Special Drawing
Rights (SOn). And I know that there is nothing to prove that the creation
of a European reserve currency will be desirable. I amwell aware that
those seemingly technical developments would, in fact, be a truly
revolutionary step.
I am also aware that, if such developments are to take place, the
EMS must, during its transitional phase, perform satisfactorily in
the eyes of all those taking part. I will be the first to admit that
there is no advance guarantee of success. But a failure would be both
the consequence and the cause of extreme difficulties in Europe and
I am convinced that there is no alternative to success.tt
M,IS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL CURRENCIES LIKE THE DOLLAR
I'As I mentioned earlier, success depends in part on the relationship which
can be established, in the immediate future and in the Iong term,
between European currencies, and I am thinking here of all European
currencies, including sterl ing. I hope that the United Kingdom, which is
a signatory to the system, will be able to take part very soon. The
forging of this relationship depends in turn on a sweeping move towards
integration in Europe in the different areas to which I referred earlier.
But success also depends to a large extent on the relationship which will
be established between the system itself and the international monetary
system, and in particular the dol lar.
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The emergence in Europe of a zone of monetary stability is in
no way an indication that the Community wishes to take a stand against
the United States but it does mean that, in order to defend this
stabi I ity, Europe must enter into a constructive dialogue with its
major partners on the future of the international monetary system.
This assumes, first of all, that non-member countries with
similar interests which play an important role in world affairs could
be associated to that venture. I will not attempt to list the countries
which, as provided for in the Bremen Communique, should, if they so
wish, be permitted to do so. I am convinced, hot+ever, that it is in
the Conmunityts interests to cooperate closely with the other countries
in Europe; it is by no means my intention to propose the setting up
of a bloc but, to strengthen the base of the EtlS and thereby to
increase its chances of success.
lmplementation of the EltlS is I inked to the strengthening of the
international rnonetary system; its durability will largely depend on
its capacity to contribute to this objective.
The creation of the EMS has, as such, a positive role to play in
the development of the international monetary system; it shows, first
of all, that there exists in the world a group of countries - and
strong countries at that - which is dissatisfied with the present
disorder and which no longer accepts that exchange rates should be
al lowed to fluctuate arbitrari ly. Far from faci I itating the international
adjustment process, the system of fluctuating exchange rates has in
part hampered it; apart from the oil-producing countries and the
sub-redistribution which has taken place in Europe, the breakdown of
the major groups of countries into creditors and debtors has remained the
same as in the early seventies.
Furthermore, the scale of intervention on foreign exchange markets
has been much greater than under the system of stable exchange rates,
and this has exacerbated the problem of liquidity, which the system of
fluctuating rates was supposed to al leviate. ln this respect, the EMS
thus represents a fundamental change in attitudes, i.e. the abandonment
of the absolute belief in the virtues of fluctuating exchange rates and,
conversely, the certainty that stability, a factor conducive to growth,
is the result of strictness and discipl ine.rl
DOLLAR NOT THE SOLE CAUSE OF MONETARY DISARMY
I'But the EMS also has a direct practical implication. There is a tendency
to attribute sole responsibility for the monetary disorder to the dollar
but we should not forget that a number of crises have been triggered by
instability in Europe and not by disarray in America. lt falls to us
to el iminate this occasional cause of world instabi I ity.
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I believe that demands for the restoration of a sound
international order will carry more weight if Europe first sets the
example, by encouraging its partners to play their part, too.
Lastly, the EHS possesses what I wilI term a "diplomaticrrforce:
during the transitional phqse in the development of the international
monetary system on which we are now embarklng, the EMS presents Europe
with an opportunity gradually to speak with one voice, on at least
equal terms, and thus to defend its own interests more effectively."
GREATER AWARXMSS OF THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION
"The directions which the dialogue may take are beconing increasingly
apparent, with the col lective awareness in industrial ized countries of
the urgent need for closely coordinated action being one of the most
encouraging features of recent years.
The first of these directions concerns moves to combat, through
intervention on the markets, exchange rate movements which have no
economic justification. lt is to be hoped that the decisions taken last
November foreshadow a much greater degree of systematic cooperation
between major monetary groups aimed at ampl ifying and diversifying the
means avai Iable for waging this combat, They are the manifestation of
a very welcome common will and, in the case of the United States, of a
better appreciation of the dangers of monetary instabi I ity. As a
monetary entity, the Community can play a major role in this connection,
as do some of its Member States already.
The second I ine of action concerns the formulation of national
economic pol icies that are compatible with the objective of international
stability. As I pointed out earlier, in the case of Europe, this will
possibly be the greatest challenge since it does not involve simple
mechanisms or the di rect external constrai nt.
This can be helped by the more systematic organization of the
dialogue, the joint consideration of domestic monetary pol icies, and
the effective appl ication of the provisions giving the lnternational
Monetary Fund (tmf) a supervisory responsibility. ln this connection,
I am convinced that it is in Europers interests to help to strengthen
the lMF. Just as we are trying to organize ourselves, on the basis of
accepted discipl ines and a stronger common organization, so we must
wish for simi lar characteristics in the international system, and so
we would like to see at least part of what we have considered good for
oursel ves to be pract i ced at the i nternat iona I I evel .
It wil I take time to develop this closeness of policies, this
awareness of the international effects of national decisions. However,
since there is no international monetary system that would impose,
through its own techniques, an obl igation to restore equi I ibria, this
is the road which must be followed.
L
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The thi rd major question - the control of international I iquidi ty,
and in particular of the Euromarkets - is more controversial. Many
arguments have been used to oppose attempts at action in this area. lnparticular such action has been termed unnecesssary (the real source of
the I iquidity problem is said to be inappropriate national pol icies),
i neffect i ve, and, even dangerous, s i nce the Euromarkets have hel ped
prevent, and are continuing to help prevent, serious disruptions
connected with lasting balance of payments disequi I ibrial'
PROSPECTIVE BENEFITS OF EMS
rrl believe, however, that we should look more closely into ways of
drawing benefit from the system while avoiding its excesses. After all,
it is not a question of establishing controls in the adverse sense of
the word, but, as central banks do at national level throughout the world,
of seeking ways of containing money creation within Iimits which are
compatible with overal I equi I ibrium. This opens up a whole field of
thought, and, one day, of action, which I believe to be important.
The factors I have outl ined, though inevitably not exhaustive,
show that in my view any progress in the international monetary field
will depend on methodical pursuit of all the possible avenues of
approach, which are linked by the need for close international cooperation.
I io not think we should underestimate the results that can be obtained
if joint action is suffficiently systematic, sufficiently continuous and,
of course, on a sufficiently large scale, for all action has its minimum
threshold of effectiveness. "
